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Abstract 
 
Germany is presently transforming into a modern immigration state, leaving behind its image of a “guest 
worker” country. Parallely, it is confronted with growing religious plurality and rising religious 
conflicts. Moreover, religious labeling of groups other than the Christian or undenominational majority 
population becomes more significant. Against this background, the paper discusses the views of the 
population in Germany towards religious plurality, practices of religious minorities as well as attitudes 
towards members of different religious groups. The results reveal a considerable amount of negative 
attitudes towards foreign religious groups in Germany. More specifically, Islam and Muslims are mostly 
viewed as negative by the German population. Structural equation models with manifest variables show 
that, in particular, the frequency of contacts have positive impacts on attitudes towards people of 
different religious affiliations.  
  
  
                                                          
1 This text is a translated and modified version of the article Pickel, Gert; Yendell, Alexander  “Einstellungen zu 
fremdreligiösen Gruppen in Deutschland und ihre Bedingungsfaktoren. “ Ed. Löw, Martina. Vielfalt und 
Zusammenhalt. Verhandlungen des 36. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Bochum und 
Dortmund 2012. Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus. 2014. 247-264 
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Religious Plurality in Germany: Attitudes and their Determining Factors 
 
1. Introduction – Attitudes towards religious groups as a subject of research 
In 2010, a German politician of the Social Democrats, Thilo Sarrazin, published a controversial book 
about immigration to Germany. Sarrazin argued that Germany is destroying itself by its immigration 
policies and one of those groups who he thinks does not show attempts to integrate itself is the Muslim 
population. Sarrazin`s book was the best selling non fictional book since World War II and its’ 
controversial arguments lead to an intensive debate on immigration. During that debate in 2010 and 
2011, two camps seem to have divided Germany. One group were filled with indignation about Sarrazins 
statements. They pointed out that people from different cultures are able to live happily side by side. 
Others were glad to have an honest debate on the “lack of willingness” of individuals with a migration 
background to integrate into German society. In this debate, fear and the perception of a Muslim threat 
to German society appeared, as well as a resentment of cultural diversity. Undeniably, these debates 
brought to the fore issues such as integration and social cohesion. The toleration of people with a 
migration background and/or with non-christian confessions was put at the top of the agenda. 
Even if the many critics of Thilo Sarrazin hate to admit it: with his controversial book he became an 
“agenda setter”. But not only Sarrazin himself fuelled the discussion. Articles in the print and online 
press, debates on television, as well as results of opinion polls, showed that the German tolerance of 
migrants and especially Muslims is not very high. It is not surprising that against this background a far 
right movement like the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) has 
risen. 
One obvious point in these debates is, that the growing tension between social integration and the 
increasing religious plurality is emphasized. Not guestworkers or immigrants, but rather religious groups 
are more and more often marked as problematic groups. Religious pluralism is the result of the increase 
of people with non-christian religious affiliation. For most European countries this is normal. Yet, 
religious pluralisation is not viewed as a relatively natural occurring result of changes within social 
structure. Rather it is viewed against the background of its sociopolitical effect. Depending on the 
normative or political position, either the willingness of migrants to integrate or the readiness to take in 
migrants on the part of the integration society is brought into question.  
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As a consequence of these developments there exists a fear of an increase of culturally induced conflicts 
in Germany (and also in other European countries). Some discourses refer to Samuel Huntington’s 
(1996) thesis of a “clash of civilizations”, which particularly made religious differences responsible for 
conflicts between societies. And also Levent Teczan (2011) who sees above all, the labelling of religious 
communities as a foreign group, as a new element of this public discourse. 
But are these statements based on social reality? Are stereotypes of religious groups really very common 
within German society? Is tolerance of other religious groups limited? Or is Germany already a 
multicultural society despite the statements of the German government and is the debate on integration 
overheated? And if there are deficits regarding the tolerance of non-christian religious groups, what are 
the reasons for them? 
The goal of this article is to reveal where the limits of tolerance of other religions and religious groups 
are in West and East Germany. This leads to a central, multidimensional question: How are non-christian 
religious groups perceived? Which attitudes towards these groups do people in Germany have, and 
which are the determining factors, which influence these attitudes? 
To answer this question we will analyse quantitative data of the survey with the title “Perception and 
Acceptance of religious Plurality” (PARD), which was conducted at the University of Münster. The 
survey focusses on attitudes towards religious pluralism in Germany, Denmark, France, Netherlands 
and Portugal. In order to explain these attitudes several influences are tested such as socio-economic 
deprivation, subjective perceived deprivation, political attitudes, forms of religiosity as well as socio-
structural factors. Hypotheses which will be tested are the contact hypothesis, which postulates a 
stereotype reducing effect of contacts with members of out-groups (Allport 1954), the concept of the 
Authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950), which assumes a correlation between authoritarian 
attitudes and the devaluation of foreigners, and also the social capital theory (Putnam 2000), which 
postulates positive effects by building up trust. 
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2. Problems of religious pluralism in Germany 
 
2.1 Religious pluralism and the integration debate 
 
One noticeable point within the heated debates of the last few years has already been mentioned: 
a lot of attention has been given to the religious imprint of groups.  This serves to describe a 
perceived problematic group. A few decades ago, foreigners or “guest workers” were singled 
out as a significant different group from the majority population. Now it is more common to 
identify “outsiders” by religious labelling. This serves to define Muslims as a problematic 
group. (Tezcan 2011: 298). This implies, that all members of a religious group are the focus of 
stereotypical labelling. This means that religion as a personality trait becomes part of the 
discussion.    
The initial point for attitudes towards other religious groups concerns their expansion  in recent decades.  
In Germany as well in other European countries a continuous process of religious pluralisation has 
occurred. Not only has the proportion of unaffiliated continuously grown (Pickel 2012), membership of 
both the catholic and protestant churches has decreased. Meanwhile other organisations and forms of 
membership have increased.  
The growing religious plurality becomes visible in the increase of Muslim citizens to 4.3 million and a 
proportion of between 5 and 6 percent, and the growth of the Christian-orthodox church to 1.8 million 
members (Haug et al. 2009: 106-108). In addition to the consequences of the integration of mostly 
foreign religious groups, there are also the higher birth rates of immigrant groups who have contributed 
to this shift - and continue to do so still. As a result of this development, the visibility of foreign religious 
groups has increased substantially in German society within a relatively short period of time.  
What has this ongoing development of religious pluralisation to do with the integration debate? 
At least four points can be noted. First, in recent years more and more information can be found on the 
concrete problems in the integration of immigrants with a particular religious affiliation (school, 
employment, citizenship, crime, ghettoization). In fact, these problems are not new, but they have moved 
more into the public arena. Here also the visibility of Muslims in public contributes to a new perception. 
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Perceived problems, which are communicated by the media or within conversations, are cognitively 
associated with this visibility. Secondly, increasingly legal conflicts over religion (e.g. religious freedom 
vs. physical integrity rights; religious education in school) have arisen- and been observed by the public. 
Thirdly, media attention to foreign religious groups has increased (especially for Muslims). Reasons for 
this are on the one hand international conflicts between the Western and Muslim world (Islamist 
terrorism and the "war on terror"), and on the other hand the polarisation of political positions on 
religion. At the same time the majority of media representations tend to give a problematized image of 
Muslims and "Islam". Moreover, the debates are more and more of a normative character with a strong 
reference to "culture" and "cultures". This normative character is also expressed in contrary positions in 
society and politics. Thus, the positions in the debate on integration split up into supporters of the 
assimilation of the "others", while another opposite group supports the idea of the coexistence of 
multiculturalism. Both positions face each other relatively irreconcilably and can be found in political 
positions. While supporters of multiculturalism emphasize the value of religious freedom and emphasise 
a transnational understanding of culture, supporters of assimilation see national cohesion at risk and 
demand a "guiding culture". The situation is similar to the "finger-pointing" regarding problems of 
integration. Supporters of assimilation see a lack of willingness to integrate on the part of migrants (and 
also people with a migration background). But which position is represented by the majority of citizens?  
2.2  Attitudes towards people with different religious affiliations 
 
The empirical findings show a certain ambiguity in the response behavior: On the one hand attitudes 
towards most foreign religious groups are moderate to mostly positive (table 1). Both Hindus and 
Buddhists and even atheists meet little hostility among citizens in West and East Germany.  
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Table I: Attitudes towards members of different religious groups and atheists 
 Muslims Jews Hindus Buddhists Christians Atheists 
West East West East West East West East West East West East 
very 
positive 
6 3 8 6 5 4 13 8 35 23 11 28 
rather 
positive 
28 23 50 47 45.0 33 52 42 55 56 43 46 
rather 
negative 
41 40 23 20 20 22 14 19 6 11 23 10 
very 
negative 
17 22 5 10 5 10 4 8 1 4 8 4 
don’t know 5 9 9 13 20 27 13 19 1 5 11 9 
no response 3 3 4 3 5 4 4 5 2 2 5 3 
Source: PARD 2010, own calculations; see also Yendell 2013: 232, values in percent. 
 
But this is only one side of the coin. Because at the same time, in both parts of Germany the majority 
express a negative view of Muslims: so the population has actually mainly positive views on different 
religious groups, but it changes with a specific labelling of religions (also Yendell 2013: 231-233; Pickel 
and Yendell 2016; Pickel et al. 2016). At least it seems to be a labelling, because the knowledge of the 
religion "Islam" among citizens is scattered rather sparsely. A difference should be noted, that one hardly 
knows who are Hindus or Buddhists, as respectively they are difficult to identify in everyday life. At 
the same time only about two percent of all Muslims live in East Germany - and there the negative 
attitudes are even more prevalent than in Western Germany. With this finding, it is clear which group is 
the focus of the integration debate - it is the Muslims. 
Figure 1:  Attitudes: rejected Muslims Figure 1:  Attitudes: rejected Muslims 
 
Source: EVS 2008 (N = 23536), own calculations; question: „On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that 
you would not like to have as neighbours?”; approval rating ; figures in percent. 
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This is confirmed by results of the analysis of an alternative question in the European Values Study: it 
can be noted that only a minority have rigid attitudes towards Muslims or foreigners (fig. 1). However, 
it must be noted that the question used measures a rather harsh and manifest form of rejection. These 
minorities are quite large: At least one-third of East Germans and almost one-fifth of the West Germans 
would not like to have Muslims as neighbours. Muslims are much more often rejected than foreigners. 
In the minds of respondents there seems to be a differentiation in terms of a religious labelling of 
individuals and groups.  
Both results clearly show the normative and political charge of the integration debate concentrating on 
the generalised labelling of "Islam" or "Muslims". Against this background one could also call the 
integration debate in Germany an Islam debate. This labelling is based upon a religious-ethical 
ascription, which clearly differs from "classical" immigration debates – but it absorbs the feelings of 
foreignness into the development of stereotypes. This is also visible in the images, which people assign 
to Islam (figure 2). 
Figure 2:  Stereotypes: Christianity and Islam 
  
Source: PARD 2010, own calculations; question: “What comes to your mind when you think of... – Islam … -
Christianity?”; approval rating; figures in percent. 
From the perspective of most Germans, Islam distinguishes itself by violence, fanaticism and 
discrimination against women. Tolerance, peacefulness and solidarity are in the view of Germans, 
foreign to Islam, which is classified as backward-looking. This blanket judgement seems to be 
influenced by the media and conflicts which occur outside of Germany. Clear stereotypes of both 
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religions exist, with Islam judged clearly worse than Christianity. Based on this perception feelings of 
alienation are connected with a sense of being threatened. 
At the same time, references to the alleged backwardness and anti-modernity of Islam, especially in the 
attitude towards women or in the observance of human rights, help to legitimize socially constructed 
stereotypes. Is it not understandable that one opposes the oppression of women and the patriarchy, which 
Islam demonstrates? Aren’t the reports of honor killings and violence against women evidence of the 
lack of adjustment to modern society by Muslims? And doesn’t the wearing of headscarves show 
symbolically this opressive backwardness? 
Against this background, religious pluralism - mainly understood as an increase of Muslims in the 
country - is the basis for conflicts for about three-quarters of the population in Germany (table 2). And 
in the Allbus 2010 three-fifths of the Germans see a relatively strong potential for a conflict between 
Christians and Muslims in Germany (Götze et al. 2013: 288). 
 
This result matches that of Samuel Huntington (1996), who postulates a clash of civilizations, which 
obviously many German citizens would also see. The approval of 41% of the population in West 
Germany and 44% in East Germany to such a statement, show how widely spread this fear is. If in 
addition to that there is a fear of real threat like the often mentioned fear of Muslim terrorists, the claim 
for consequences are not unreasonable. 43% in West-Germany and even 55% in East Germany support 
the limitation of islamic faith and two-thirds of the West Germans and three quarters of the East Germans 
support the idea of limiting the immigration of Muslims to Germany . 
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Table II:  Statements on Islam and Muslims and Attitudes towards religious symbols 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PARD 2010, own calculations; question: “Now I would like to ask you some questions about Islam. What 
is your opinion on the following statements?” statements: “The immigration of Muslims into Germany should be 
limited”; “The increasing number of Muslims in our society is a cause of conflict.”;  Sometimes I fear that there 
could be many terrorists among the Muslims in Germany.”; “Practicing the Islamic faith in Germany must be 
severely restricted.”; see also Pollack 30ff; figures in percent. 
 
Other figures show that the willingness to integrate Muslim citizens, especially regarding their 
religiosity and its symbols, has narrow limits. Some three quarters of the German population, from both 
East and West, reject the building of mosques and minarets and the introduction of a Muslim holiday. 
Germans still assume a certain cultural background - namely Christianity. Even if Christian religious 
affiliations seem to wane in the process of secularization (see Pickel and Sammet 2011), Christianity is 
– as expected – much more legitimated than Islamic culture. The criticism from parts of the majority 
population, that Muslim citizens contribute only little to their integration, appears to be associated with 
a limited tolerance to a visible and institutionalized religious pluralism. These attitudes are certainly 
volatile. Public debates and terrorist attacks can at any time inflame the situation. At present, pragmatism 
still prevails in dealing with Muslims, but this does not necessarily always have to be the case. Another 
terrorist attack like 9/11 could change the situation dramatically. 
However, the relevance of such perceptions of attitudes towards foreign religious groups requires 
examination. These were so far - certainly with great plausibility - accepted, but do they sustain a 
causality test? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limitation of 
immigration of 
Muslims 
 
increasing number of 
Muslims is a cause of 
conflict 
Fear of terrorists 
among Muslims 
Limitation of islamic 
practices of faith 
Germany-
West 
Germany-
East 
Germany-
West 
Germany-
East 
Germany-
West 
Germany-
East 
Germany-
West 
Gemrany-
East 
agree 
strongly 30 43 25 34 23 35 15 27 
agree 
somewhat 36 33 47 40 39 33 28 28 
disagree 
somewhat 21 15 20 18 26 23 39 31 
disagree 
strongly 9 6 5 5 11 7 14 9 
don’t know 3 3 3 3 1 2 4 5 
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3. Factors explaining attitudes towards foreign religious groups in Germany  
3.1  Theories and hypotheses 
 
For an explanation of tolerance to members of foreign religious groups, some sociological and social 
psychological theories are available. These theories take a more general view of stereotypes of other 
social groups, but can readily be applied to this question. One important theory for the explanation of 
stereotypes, is the Social Identity Theory(SIT) (Tajfel). According to the SIT, prejudices arise due to 
processes of identification with social groups. The need for positive self-esteem within a group, leads 
the individual to emphasise the appreciation of the ingroup (ingroup) and devalue other groups 
(outgroup). In this process the frequently occurring assignment of group-based stereotypes can 
encourage feelings of threat. Concepts linked to deprivation are relevant here. They are used in particular 
in times of economic recession to explain rejection of strangers and postulate a relationship between 
perceived discrimination against the majority population and the devaluation of minorities that compete 
with the majority for scarce resources. Accordingly, it is expected that low social status and / or the 
subjective perception of socio-economic deprivation correlates with xenophobic attitudes. 
Authoritarianism, a personality-based approach, can also be used to explain negative attitudes towards 
foreign religious groups. Sticking to conventions, power orientation and subservience characterize an 
authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950). In the sociology of religion, research on prejudice arising 
from religious dogmatism is named as an explanatory factor based on the concept of authoritarianism. 
It is assumed that religious dogmatic attitudes negatively affect how religious communities are viewed.  
While these approaches deal with the predictors of stereotypes and prejudices, others emphasize an 
opposite effect. The most prominent theory in the research on prejudice, is the so-called "contact 
hypothesis" (Allport 1954). According to this hypothesis, individual personal contact with members of 
the outgroup may lead to a reduction of prejudice, as can wider knowledge of the respective out group. 
However its claim to credibility has to be considered. A certain problem exists in the causal direction of 
the statements of the contact hypothesis. It is conceivable that not only contacts help reduce prejudice, 
but that unprejudiced persons increasingly tend to establish contacts with strangers. Whether contacts 
reduce prejudice or openess towards strangers makes contacts likely, still remains difficult to assess. 
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However, it is to be assumed that contacts at least exert a stabilizing effect. In this context the social 
capital hypothesis is in line with the contact hypothesis, postulating that membership of volunteer 
organisations and consolidated face-to-face contacts produce trust (Götze et al. 2013). Specifically, 
"bridging social capital", is supposed to have a positive effect on interpersonal trust and attitudes toward 
foreign religious groups.  
3.2  Empirical explanations for attitudes toward foreign religious groups in Germany 
 
To explain the negative attitudes towards Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Jews and atheists in the old and 
new federal states of Germany, we have produced a total of twelve structural equation models with only 
manifest variables, which can be derived from the described theoretical considerations. The dependent 
variable here is the attitude towards Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, atheists and Christians, which 
has been presented in table 1. In reference to Edinger and Hallermann (2001) we assume that prejudices 
can be best explained by a complex system of hypotheses, which results in the consideration of a very 
large number of items in the model. The path models offer the advantage that they – unlike conventional 
regression analyses – take the multicollinearity between the influencing indicators as well as 
measurement errors into account and reduce the probability of false interpretations (Weiber and 
Mühlhaus 2010: 25). Cases with missing values were excluded from the calculation due to the necessary 
statistical requirements. For both, the West German and East German models, it can be concluded that 
the models approximate well to reality. The values are for all models under the recommended limit of 
0.05 for a good model fit (Browne and Cudeck 1992: 239). Thus, all models have a high validity.  
The results: A strong influencing factor is xenophobia. This factor correlates relatively strongly in both 
East and West Germany with regard to attitudes towards Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Jews. Little 
correlation exists in the attitude towards atheists. In East Germany, a negative relationship between 
xenophobia and the attitude towards Christians is also noted. A little correlation exists with regard to 
the attitude towards atheists. In East Germany, a negative relationship between xenophobia and the 
attitude towards Christians is also noted. Even if in interpreting, a problem of tautology occurs, it seems 
necessary to leave the item in the model, since it contributes a considerable proportion of explained 
variance. The indicator can be viewed as an indicator of xenophobia, describing the syndrome of group-
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related enmity (Heitmeyer 2008). A general rejection of strangers proves especially disadvantageous for 
Muslims and other foreign religious groups. The effect on the attitude towards Muslims is the strongest.  
The most interesting factor concerns the element regarding the frequency of contact. In both parts of 
Germany, the more frequently people have contact with Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews 
and atheists, the more likely their attitudes towards the respective groups are positive. The frequency of 
contact is the only indicator that is significant in all models. This can be viewed as a confirmation of the 
contact hypothesis. It is likely that the differences in western and eastern Germany are to a large extent 
a result of the different frequency distributions of the variables.  
Table III:  Factors influencing attitudes towards Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews 
and atheists in West Germany – path models with simple causal structure (beta 
coefficients) 
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Source: PARD 2010, own calculations; the items authoritarianim, net household income, redundancy, level of education as well as urban vs. 
rural area have no significant impact in any model; ***: p <= 0,001, **: p <= 0,01, *: p <= 0,05, n. s.: not signifcant (as direct influencing 
variable); all questions in the appendix 
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That means, that the slightly more common negative attitudes in East Germany can attributed to the 
comparatively low level of pluralisation and the associated rare contacts with other religious people in 
East Germany.  
The idea that religions lead to conflict rather than peace, reduces the acceptance of members of 
Abrahamic religions in West Germany.This also applies to East Germany (Fig. 6), with the exception 
of the attitude towards Jews. Stereotypes, it seems, are - as already suggested in the descriptive part - 
intensified by perceived religious conflicts. Fittingly, the rejection of Muslims has increased after 
September 11 in both parts of Germany. In particular, the media is assumed to be involved in the 
formation of stereotypes by focussing on "bad news" (Schiffer 2005). 
The concept of deprivation plays remarkably little significant role in the explanation of attitudes to 
foreign religious groups. This applies to unemployment, household income and position on the social 
ladder. At least some consideration was given to the question of economic equity. In West Germany, 
this subjective relative deprivation has a slightly negative effect on the attitude towards Muslims, 
Hindus, Buddhists and Jews. In East Germany, the indicator exerts a slightly negative effect on the 
attitude towards Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews and atheists. However, the feeling of social 
deprivation in East Germany has no negative effect on the attitude towards Muslims. Overall, we note, 
however, that the link between deprivation and negative attitudes toward foreign religious groups is low. 
Authoritarianism correlates in different directions with the attitudes. This indicates validity problems of 
the authoritarianism items. Religious dogmatism, however, shows an effect: Anyone who believes that 
there is only one true religion, is more prone to reject Hindus, Buddhists, Jews and atheists. With care, 
this could be also be called a fundamentalist position. In West Germany, however, this applies to 
Muslims, in East Germany this is not the case. There it is rather striking that a religiously dogmatic 
attitude is slightly positively related to the attitude towards Christians.  
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Table IV:  Factors influencing attitudes towards Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews 
and atheists in East Germany – path models with simple causal structure (beta 
coefficients) 
Source: PARD 2010, own calculations; the items authoritarianim, net household income, redundancy, level of education as well as urban vs. 
rural area have no significant impact in any model; ***: p <= 0,001, **: p <= 0,01, *: p <= 0,05, n. s.: not signifcant (as direct influencing 
variable); all questions in the appendix 
From the view of the Sociology of Religion, it is interesting that church attendance – under the control 
of other variables – can affect attitudes towards foreign religious communities positively. This applies 
to West Germany as well as East Germany not only as expected regarding Christians, but also regarding 
Hindus and Jews. In West Germany - unlike in East Germany - church attendance has a positive effect 
on attitudes towards Muslims. In East Germany, frequent churchgoers are also more positive towards 
Buddhists, in West Germany, this does not apply. As we expected , church attendance has a significant 
but negative effect on the attitude towards atheists. The result that church attendance exerts a positive 
effect on attitudes towards members of other religious communities, may be surprising at first glance. 
However, it is not surprising when you consider that church attendance is associated with religious 
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dogmatism. Many people who frequently attend church are also rather religiously dogmatic. 
Nevertheless, church attendance itself has a positive effect on attitudes towards members of other 
religious communities. With some caution, this can be interpreted as the effect of religious social capital 
(Götze et al. 2013). 
4.  Conclusion – Stereotypes, successes of contact and the media debate on Islam 
Summarizing the results, in Germany a considerable amount of negative attitudes towards foreign 
religious groups is to be stated. But not all religious groups are affected by these negative attitudes in 
the same way. While the members of most religions (including atheists) are perceived more positive or 
at least neutral, the attitudes towards Islam and Muslims is mostly negative. Thus it can be stated that 
the current "integration debate" is essentially a "debate on Islam". For this, a combination of general 
xenophobia, feelings of threat and negative media perception are responsible. No longer the "foreign" 
immigrants, but the Muslims labelled dangerous (Tezcan 2011) are those who will be encountered by 
the Germans in East and West. This is less about specific problems , more about stereotypes. 
This shows the even greater proportion of people with diffuse and rather negative attitudes towards 
Muslims in East Germany compared to West Germany. In East Germany contacts are much less than in 
West Germany. Contacts again - this reveals the performed regression analyzes – usually leading to trust 
and therefore have a positive impact on the integration of people with different religious affiliations. 
However, the effect of direct contatcts is limited. They are covered on the overall social level through 
the media, which reinforces stereotypes (eg bad news on Islam). This is partly due to the limited number 
of contacts, and also because of the great formative power of the media-transmitted conflict and 
perception of threat. Specifically, the perception of Islam as a religion of conflict in combination with a 
media coverage which produces an image of Islam as a religion of terror and violence confirms 
stereotypes - and produces them. More media reports on intra-German problems with Muslim citizens 
reinforce these sterotypes Religious dogmatism support these processes even more. 
What does this mean for attitudes toward foreign religious groups? It is not the religious diversity per 
se, which raises integration problems. Rather it is the possible consequences and scenarios in the minds 
of citizens which pose problems for the social (and political) cohesion in Germany. A rather negative 
and limited trusting attitude towards a specific outgroup does not necessarily lead into social exclusion 
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and conflict, but it also provides no protection when the population reacts negatively to individual events 
(eg terrorist attack by Islamists in Germany). Accordingly, there is a tolerance to members of foreign 
religious groups, but it has limits - and these are apparently narrower than expected.  
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Appendix 
 
frequency of contact with Muslims: ”Do you personally have contact with members of the following religious 
groups?”; 4 point scale (1= yes, a lot; 2= yes, somewhat; 3:=no, rather not; 4=no, not at all) 
relative deprivation: “Compared with how others live in (country): Do you think you get your fair share, more 
than your fair share, somewhat less or very much less than your fair share?” (1=More than fair share; 2= Fair 
share; 3=somewhat less; 4=very much less) 
Position on social ladder: “Some people believe, that they belong to high society, whereas others believe they 
belong to underclass. Please try to imagine a ladder with seven steps and each of them stands for a social status. 
Where would you and your family stand om such a ladder? 7 means “on top” and 1 means “at the bottom. 
authoritarianism: “We should be grateful for leaders who can tell us exactly what to do and how to do it”; 4 point 
scale (1=disagree strongly; 2=disagree somewhat; 3=agree somewhat; 4=agree strongly) 
religous dogmatism: „There is only one true religion.“; 4 point scale: 1=disagree strongly; 2=disagree somewhat; 
3=agree somewhat; 4=agree strongly) 
national pride: “I’m proud of my nationality”; 4 point scale (1=disagree strongly; 2=disagree somewhat; 3=agree 
somewhat; 4=agree strongly) 
xenophobia: “There are too many foreigners living in Germany”; 4 point scale (1=disagree strongly; 2=disagree 
somewhat; 3=agree somewhat; 4=agree strongly) 
religion leads to conflict: “Looking around the world, religions bring more conflict than peace”; (1=disagree 
strongly; 2=disagree somewhat; 3=agree somewhat; 4=agree strongly) 
political attitude: “Some people are talking of „left“ and „right“ when trying to describe different political 
ttitudes. Where would you place your own political attitudes on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means ‘left’ and 10 
means ‘right’?”; 10 point scale (1=left; 10=right) 
frequency of church attendance: “How often do you attend religious service?“ (Never, less than once a year, 
several times a year, about once a month, 2-3 times a month, every week or more often) 
religion leads to conflicts: “Looking around the world, religions bring more conflict than peace”; 4 point scale 
(1=disagree strongly; 2=disagree somewhat; 3=agree somewhat; 4=agree strongly) 
educational background: not completed school, German „Volks-/Hauptschule“, German „Realschule“, 
polytechnic high school (8th or 9th Class), polytechnic high school (10th class), German Fachhochschulreife, 
German Abitur, degree at university of applied sciences, university degree) 
 
 
